The traditional approach towards (negative) polarity items is to answer the question in which contexts NPIs are licensed. The inspiring approaches of Kadmon & Landman (1990 (K&L) and Krifka (1990 Krifka ( , 1992 Krifka ( , 1995 go a major step further: they also seek to answer the question of why these contexts license NPIs. To explain the appropriate use of polarity items in questions, however, we need to answer an even more challenging question: why is a NPI used in a particular utterance in the first place? K&L and Krifka go some way to answer this question as well, but I seek to give the question a somewhat 'deeper' explanation.
Introduction
According to Ladusaw (1979) , among many others, the distribution of polarity items in questions can be stated easily: Polarity items, whether positive or negative, can appear freely in questions independently of the occurrence of triggers (like negation) and anti-triggers. As far as purely syntactic and semantic analyses of NPI licensing is concerned, it seems that there is nearly nothing of interest to say about questions as a licensing category. 1 As observed mostly by Borkin (1971) , however, there exist systematic correlations between restrictions of appropriate use of questions containing these polarity items and speakers' assumptions and expectations. Only a pragmatic account of polarity items seems to be able to say something about this. Recently, Kadmon & Landman (1990 and Krifka (1990 Krifka ( , 1992 Krifka ( , 1995 argued that we should not be satisfied by merely characterizing the contexts in which polarity items are licensed, but should also explain why these contexts do so. This suggests that their analyses are, in principle, well-suited to explain Borkin's observations. Indeed, I will argue that they are, but also that their brief remarks concerning NPIs in questions will neither suffice nor are fully explanatory. In this paper I will * My interest for polarity items was triggered during my stay at M.I.T. in spring of 2000. The basic idea behind the paper is already a year old or so. A paper by, and especially discussion with, Elena Guerzoni (end 2001), however, helped me to realize that the analysis of rhetorical questions I had in mind wouldn't quite suffice. Though it didn't make me exactly happy at the time, I thank her for criticizing me after all. The main ideas behind this paper were presented at an internal colloquium at the university of Amsterdam, and at the Utrecht-Amsterdam workshop on negative polarity. Thanks to Maria Aloni, Raffaella Bernardi, Alastair Butler, Paul Dekker, Marie Nilsenova, Martin Stokhof and Katrin Schulz for discussion and to Darrin Hindsill for checking grammar and spelling. The research of this work is supported by a fellowship from the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), which is gratefully acknowledged.
1 But see section 4 of this paper and Han & Siegel (1996) for more discussion and/or explicit disagreement.
explain the distribution of polarity items in questions by (i) adopting a not so standard analysis of even-type NPIs; (ii) looking at a not so standard analysis of questions; and (iii) generalizing K&L's and Krifka's crucial notion of strength for assertions in a natural and systematic way to that of maximal entropy for questions. Moreover, I will explain why asking a question with maximal entropy is optimal to look for, by reducing it to maximization of utility. I will discuss the occurrence of polarity items in both information-seeking and rhetorical readings of questions.
In the second part I will motivate Kadmon & Landman's and Krifka's 'strengthening' analyses of NPIs by iterating arguments of them and others of why the more traditional accounts of Fauconnier, Ladusaw and Linebarger won't suffice. Section 3 starts with a discussion of in how far questions give rise to downward entailing (DE) contexts and with some observations concerning the use of NPIs in questions, and continues with a discussion of Ladusaw's proposal to account for these observations. In section 4, I review some proposals of how to deal with NPIs in rhetorical questions. I will defend the view that rhetorical questions are really information-seeking, although the question is open with respect to a minimum quantity only. Domain extension and a presupposition of even-type NPIs are crucial to account for this. Section 5 is about information-seeking questions. I will suggest that the DE analysis can be stretched further here than is normally assumed, but I will propose that in the end strength for questions should be instantiated by entropy. These proposals will be backed up in the sixth section of the paper, by relating entropy to that of strength and utility. The paper ends with some conclusions and outlook to further research.
2 From scale reversal to strengthening Fauconnier (1975a, b) noted that expressions that typically 'license' negative polarity items, like negation, surprise and doubt, have something in common: they invert scales. From this he hypothesized that we can characterize NPI-licensing contexts as those contexts that do so. What's more, Fauconnier suggested that because expressions like lift a finger, bat an eye and one sound denote the lowest endpoints of a scale, they can function (just) as NPIs (highest-endpoint) in negative contexts.
Fauconnier proposed to give a pragmatic analysis of NPI licensing in terms of scale-reversal contexts. Ladusaw (1979) proposed to give a semantic characterization of such contexts independently of scales. He noted that clauses embedded under negation and other scale-reversal contexts are downward entailing. Context X − Y is downward entailing (DE) iff from the truth of XαY and the fact that β entails 2 α we can conclude to the truth of XβY . Thus, a context is DE iff an expression occurring in it can be replaced by a semantically stronger expression salva veritate.
Although the analysis of NPI licensing in terms of DE contexts is very successful, there are a number of problems with it. A first problem is that it cannot account for the fine-structure of polarity licensing: it seems that some NPIs, like as much as a dime, have stronger contextual requirements than others like any and ever. Zwarts (1981 Zwarts ( , 1986 ), Hoeksema (1986) and van der Wouden (1994) characterized different 'negative' contexts algebraically, and proposed that these different kinds of contexts license different kinds of NPIs. Only for weak NPIs like (unstressed) any and ever (or its Dutch translations) is it enough, according to their proposals, that the contexts are DE. Another need for fine-structure follows from Linebarger's (1980) observed contrast between (1a) and (1b): the item as much as in the restriction of every is licensed in case the whole sentence expresses a necessary, but not in case it expresses an accidental generalization.
(1) a. Every restaurant that charges so much as a dime for iceberg lettuce ought to be closed down.
b. ?? Every restaurant that charges so much as a dime for iceberg lettuce has four stars in the handbook. Heim (1984) observes that this contrast does not occur for any and ever and suggests to make a distinction between, on the one hand, NPIs for which DEness suffices to license, and, on the other, Fauconnier-type NPIs that denote minimal values. For minimizers a DE context is not enough to license the NPI. Following an earlier suggestion of Schmerling (1971) , she proposes that their licensing conditions should involve the presuppositions of even, and thereby making licensing depending on common grounds in which a sentence can be uttered felicitously.
But even if we limit ourselves to weak NPIs like any and ever, the logico-semantic analysis of Ladusaw is problematic. First, if any has a free choice (FC) reading it can occur in a non-DE context. Second, as observed by Linebarger (1980 Linebarger ( , 1987 , Heim (1984) and Jacobs (1985) , NPIs are sometimes licensed in contexts that are not DE according to Ladusaw's definition. Linebarger (1980 Linebarger ( , 1987 argues that although (2a) is acceptable, the complement of the adversative surprise is not a DE context, because there are circumstances in which the substitution of the complement with a stronger alternative does not preserve its truth value. Jacobs and Heim note that although according to the standard Lewis/Stalnaker analysis of conditionals the antecedents are not DE contexts, they still license NPIs as in (2b). Jacobs (1985) , finally, argues that although substitution with stronger alternatives in the general phrase of a comparative is in general not allowed, NPIs as in (2c) typically are licensed.
(2) a. I'm surprised that he ever said anything.
b. If you ever visit China, you will enjoy it.
c. Mary speaks more languages than Katrin could ever dream of. Heim (1984) argued that although the antecedent of a conditional is perhaps not DE in Ladusaw's sense, it still is limited DE if we consider only alternative antecedents that result from substituting the NPI for another item of the scale with which the NPI is associated. Thus, a sentence like (2b) is not really a counterexample for a DE-like approach. Kadmon & Landman (1993) and von Fintel (1999) claim even that a sentence like (2b) is not a counterexample to Ladusaw's account at all, if we are willing to make the proposition expressed by a conditional statement more context-dependent than the standard Lewis/Stalnaker analysis assumes. Similarly, Kadmon & Landman argue that the adversative predicate be surprised is DE once we fix a certain perspective, and suggest to account for the licensing of ever in (2c) in the same way.
But if surprise is DE, why not be glad, a predicate that normally does not license NPIs? Moreover, NPIs are sometimes unacceptable in contexts that are clearly DE:
3 As already observed by Horn (1972) , for instance, sentences like (3) are unacceptable, although the restrictor of each is obviously DE.
(3) *Each candidate who has any interest in semantics will be admitted to the department. Linebarger (1980) argues to give up on the DE analysis and proposes an alternative hypothesis building on Baker's (1970) account of direct and indirect lincensing. Baker proposed that a NPI is licensed either directly by negation, or indirectly when the sentence in which the NPI occurs entails a sentence that directly licenses the NPI. Linebarger proposes that for indirect licensing the 'entailment' should be weakened to implication.
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Linbebarger's analysis of indirect licensing, however, is problematic. First, it is not general enough. As noted by Krifka (1992) , her analysis fails to account for the fact that NPIs are allowed in non-rhetorical questions. As will be discussed extensively later, although it is not implausible to assume that rhetorical questions implicate a negative answer, this assumption is certainly too strong for an information-seeking question like (4): (4) Did you ever smoke marihuana?
Second, as noted already by Linebarger herself, her analysis is also too general because the truth-conditional equivalence between p and ¬¬p, has the undesirable result that, according to Linebarger's analysis, NPIs are allowed in all environments. Linebarger attempts to rule out this kind of licensing by stipulation, but Kadmon & Landman (1993, p. 377) Before we can answer this question, Kadmon & Landman (1990 and Krifka (1990 Krifka ( , 1992 Krifka ( , 1995 argue, we should take into consideration some additional shortcomings of the standard DE analysis.
6 First, Ladusaw's analysis leaves it unclear why any indicates a reduced tolerance for exceptions. Second, as mentioned above already, on Ladusaw's analysis it is mysterious why any in the first argument of each and both are (normally) unacceptable. Third, Kadmon & Landman (1993) argue that although glad that does not give rise to a DE context, it still licenses any when the resulting sentence has a so-called 'settle for less' interpretation. Fourth, and most relevant for this paper, a DE analysis might give a reasonably good description of the contexts that license NPIs, it does not at all explain why this is the case. Moreover, for the analysis it would be irrelevant what the NPIs by themselves mean. Though it is true that many negative polarity items that carry the 'implicature' of a licensing requirement are idiomatic, it is equally true that becoming a negative polarity item is productive. This suggests that the reason why some expressions are (only) licensed in DE contexts has something to do with the meaning of these expressions.
The approaches of Kadmon & Landman (1990 and Krifka (1990 Krifka ( , 1992 Krifka ( , 1995 try to account for these problems by taking the meaning of negative polarity items into account.
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Primarily to account for the reduced tolerance of exceptions and to give a uniform analysis of PS and FC any, Kadmon & Landman (1990 argue that an NP of the form any CN should be interpreted like the corresponding indefinite a CN, but where the domain of quantification over which the indefinite with any ranges is wider than the domain of a CN, and where the sole 4 A similar suggestion was made by Reinhard (1976) . 5 Linebarger also proposed a somewhat different analysis of 'direct licensing' in terms of immediate scope in order to account for so-called 'intervention effects'. Because intervention effects won't be important in this paper, I won't go into the details of Linebarger's syntactic analysis.
6 I will ignore here, and in the rest of the paper, the problem of how to account for any under its free choice reading.
7 See also Lahiri (1998) for a similar approach. It should be noted that Giannakidou's (1997) very different analysis to explain the distribution of polarity items takes their meanings into account as well. In my own terms she argues, for instance, that any is a marked indefinite. On the extra assumption that unmarked indefinites at top (sentential) level have a 'specific' interpretation, any is licensed only in modal or non-episodic contexts where the indefinite cannot be interpreted specifically. Though interesting, and potentially relevant for NPIs in information-seeking questions, I will mostly ignore her approach in the rest of this paper.
difference between PS and FC any lies in the fact that the latter, but not the former, is interpreted generically.
They note that in terms of this 'widening' analysis of any, the unacceptability of this item under each, 8 and the licensing of any under glad that with a 'settle for less' interpretation, can be explained naturally. What still needs to be explained, however, is why any, and other NPIs, are typically licensed in DE contexts only. Thus, we still need an explanation of why (5a) is unacceptable, but (5b) is not:
(5) a. *John ate anything.
b. John didn't eat anything. Kadmon & Landman (1990 propose to account for this by a second meaning-part of any: the interpretation of the sentence after domain widening has to be stronger than before widening. Because extension of the domain over which (kind of) things John might eat would make 'John ate something' only weaker, i.e. less informative, (5a) is correctly predicted to be unacceptable. Sentence (5b), on the other hand, gets a stronger, more informative, interpretation after domain widening, and is thus predicted to be acceptable. Thus, the licensing of NPIs in DE contexts does not have to be stipulated, but falls out as a 'theorem' of their analysis.
Notice that in distinction with Ladusaw's analysis of NPI licensing in terms of DEness, an explanation in terms of widening and strengthening, just like Fauconnier's and Heim's analyses, crucially involves the sentence with the NPI itself: the interpretations of the sentence before and after widening are compared with respect to their strengths. In fact, Kadmon & Landman argue themselves that this is one of the crucial advantages of the widening approach compared to Ladusaw's analysis. It is needed, for instance, to explain why any can be licensed under glad. Notice, moreover, that any analysis that makes use of a comparison between propositions in terms of their strength, one of which is the interpretation of a sentence with a NPI, presupposes that the sentence with the NPI has an interpretation. Thus, to speak with (Ladusaw 1995) sentences with non-licensed NPIs are not ill-formed because they have no meaning, 9 but rather their meaning is ill-suited to accomplish the conventionally required goal of strengthening the statement.
Kadmon & Landman's explanation of the licensing of any in DE contexts is very intuitive and extends naturally to other polarity items.
10 DE-licensing results from the conventional meaning of the NPI expression: domain widening and strengthening. Now, domain-widening seems a natural meaning to associate with an expression, but that doesn't seem to be the case with strengthening. In fact, I find Kadmon & Landman's explanation of licensing in DE contexts natural and appealing only because they can reduce it to the very general notion of strengthening, a notion used to explain many pragmatic phenomena. By making the strengthening requirement part of the conventional, semantic, meaning of the NPI, however, the 'explanation' of DE-licensing loses much of its initial appeal. It suggests that the strengthening requirement that Kadmon & Landman associate with NPIs is equally arbitrary as Ladusaw's DE-licensing requirement, or, say, the conventional way we associate 'chairs' with chairs.
11
Independently of Kadmon & Landman (1990 , Krifka (1990 Krifka ( , 1992 Krifka ( , 1995 developed his own account of NPI licensing that aims to give a 'deeper' pragmatic explanation of why NPI 8 For a somewhat similar explanation of this fact, although stated in somewhat different terms, see Giannakidou (1997, p. 139 ).
9 Such an account would be counterintuitive anyway, because it is forced to claim that ill-formed Meg ate any fruitcake becomes well-formed, suddenly, when embedded under I doubt that.
10 Note that Krifka's (1992 Krifka's ( , 1995 analysis of ever closely resembles K&L's domain-widening analysis of any. 11 Of course, it is always a question what pragmatics should explain: why speakers implicate something in that particular situation, or why the conventional meaning associated with an expression could have become the one it is? See van Rooy (ms) for extensive discussion.
sentences should involve strengthening. Following Fauconnier (1975a Fauconnier ( ,b, 1980 and Heim (1984) , he tries to reduce NPI licensing to scalar implicature, giving the analysis a Gricean motivation. He argues that NPIs are conventionally associated with scales and that these NPIs themselves denote the minimal elements of these scales. Krifka's Gricean reduction of NPIs to scalar implicatures means that the speaker must have a good reason to use the sentence with the NPI instead of a sentence where the NPI is substituted for an alternative of the scale. 12 Assuming with Grice that in most situations the speaker should, or wants to, express the strongest claim he can make, this gives rise to the (scalar) implicature that any sentence resulting from the substitution of the NPI by an alternative of the scale is false.
13
The main goal of Krifka's analysis is to explain why NPIs are licensed in the contexts that they are. And just like for Kadmon & Landman, this explanation crucially involves (i) the meaning of the polarity item; (ii) the comparison with interpretations of alternative sentences; and (iii) a notion of strength. Why are NPIs typically licensed in DE contexts only, i.e., why is (5b) acceptable, but (5a) not? The explanation is basically the same as the one offered by K&L but now given a Gricean motivation: after substitution of anything by a more specific alternative, the resulting sentence gets stronger in case of (5b), but not in case of (5a). The reason is, as already noted by Fauconnier (1975a,b) and Ladusaw (1979) , that in case the NPI is the weakest element of a scale, the sentence (5a) remains the weakest element of the (induced) scale formed by the sentential frame 'Mary saw -', but that the induced scale reverses once embedded in a DE context (as in (5b)), turning weakest elements into strongest ones. Because the pragmatic condition requires (via implicature and/or appropriateness condition) that the NPI sentence must be the strongest, i.e. most informative, one of the alternatives, (5a) is acceptable, but (5b) is not. K&L (1993) note that (in)appropriateness in general cannot explain (un)grammaticality and suggest that the licensing of NPIs in (non-)DE contexts is so hard-wired that it cannot be reduced to mere (in)appropriateness. Krifka (1995) counters this objection, however, by noting that his explanation of the (non)licensing of NPIs is based on something more general than mere (in)appropriateness in a conversation: a declarative sentence with a NPI in a (non)DE context is systematically (weaker) stronger than the corresponding alternatives. As a result, we don't have to build the notion of 'strength' into the conventional meaning of the NPI as K&L do.
Krifka can account for many properties of any without making use of domain extension. In fact, he argues that this is needed, too, because in mathematical sentences, for instance, any can occur without there being a domain extension involved: (6) This sequence doesn't contain any prime numbers.
Indeed, in this sentence no widening of the domain of prime numbers seems to be involved.
14 But, then, how does Krifka account for those examples for which Kadmon & Landman crucially rely on domain widening, as the indication of reduced tolerance for exception? Krifka (1995) suggests that this effect takes place only in case the NPI is used emphatically, and argues that emphatically used, or strong, NPIs have a non-exhaustive meaning, which essentially comes down to the claim that the existential quantifier associated with the NPI can range over more minor things than any of its alternatives. Krifka (1995) suggests that this difference between weak and strong NPIs, with exhaustive and non-exhaustive scalar alternatives, respectively, also accounts for some of the distribution effects of NPIs that Zwarts (1981) intended to capture by algebraic means.
Polarity Items in Questions

Observations
Although it is well known that questions license NPIs, the standard accounts always had difficulty to explain why. Questions don't need to contain a negation, as the earliest analysis of Klima (1964) would demand, and neither are questions downward entailing in any straightforward way. To see the latter, notice that according to the most reasonable entailment relation between questions, one question entails another, if every complete answer to the former is also a complete answer to the latter. 15 To illustrate that polar questions are not downward entailing in their subject position, consider the following interrogatives: It is clear that (7a) does not entail (7b), because the negative answer to the former is still compatible with both answers to (7b). Yes-no questions are not downward entailing in their predicate position either, because the negative answer of (8) However, wh-questions are downward entailing with respect to their subject position. The whquestion resulting from enlarging the domain over which the wh-phrase ranges entails the question before domain extension. That is, every full answer to (10a) entails a full answer to (10b). What is even more puzzling for Ladusaw's DE analysis is that questions also allow for positive polarity items (PPIs) like rather and pretty, and this typically in questions which do contain an explicit negation:
16 15 This is of course the entailment relation defended by Groenendijk & Stokhof (1984) , but also taken over (at least implicitly) by some proponents of the Hamblin/Karttunen question semantics like Roberts (1996) . 16 See Borkin (1971) and Pope (1972) .
(13) a. Would(n') t you rather stay here?
b. Aren't you pretty tired?
It appears as if polarity items can occur freely in questions. Borkin (1971) observes, however, that that is not true. The acceptability of questions with NPIs and PPIs varies with context: questions in which a negative answer is expected allow for NPIs, while questions which expect a positive answer license PPIs.
17 Borkin (1971) and Heim (1984) also observe a distinction in distribution between NPIs like (unstressed) any and ever, and NPIs like lift a finger and bat an eye. Whereas the former type of NPIs can be used in standard information-seeking questions and don't need to be stressed (see above), the latter type of polarity items require stress to be acceptable and give the question a rhetorical reading. In correspondence with her earlier intuition, Borkin (1971) notes that so-called INPQs can be used appropriately only when a negative answer is expected (i.e. Jane isn't expected to come), while ONPQs are used appropriately only when a positive answer is expected (i.e. Jane is expected to come).
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Borkin (1971) observes that NPQs like (15) can be used in yet another way, 19 namely as an expression of surprise that the embedded sentence appears to be true. 20 In this reading only NPIs 17 Where 'expectation of a negative answer' isn't necessarily equivalent with 'believe that positive answer is false'. 18 Han (2001) speculates that 'when a speaker is formulating a question to find out whether p or ¬p, she formulates the question with the form of the proposition which would be the most informative if it turned out to be true.' Thus, in case the speaker asks a positive/negative polar question, she considers it (probably) more likely that ¬p/p is true. This prediction is somewhat surprising: if one answer of a positive polar questions is more likely, I think, it is rather the positive one. Moreover, I agree with Borkin and Ladd that for the perhaps most typical negative polar questions, i.e. an INPQ, answer ¬p is more likely. True, by using a negative polar questions of the form ¬p? we typically expect an affirmative answer. However, this expectation concerns that what is questioned: for ONPQs this is p, for INPQs this is ¬p (See also Kay, 1990) . 19 Actually, in yet two other ways, but I will ignore her so-called 'disguised-order' reading of NPQs. Second, she notes that what is presupposed in (17a) is the general statement that Lois doesn't drink liquor, leaving it open whether she doesn't drink ANY liquor at all, i.e. not even mild ones or minor quantities. So, the presupposition, or strong expectation, of the negative answer does not concern the question with the NPI, but rather the question without the NPI, or with an alternative of the NPI.
Ladusaw's analysis
In the eighth' chapter of his dissertation, Ladusaw (1979) tries to account for the licensing of NPIs in questions. The aim of the chapter is to explain the correlation observed by Borkin (1971) between the appearance of NPIs and PPIs in questions and the expected negative and positive response, respectively. His idea is that it is not so much the question itself that licenses the NPI or PPI, but rather the expected answer. For polar questions this means that in case the expected answer is negative, the hearer can use the embedded clause of the question combined with a negation, and the latter licenses the NPI. 21 As observed by Krifka (1995) , this analysis might get the right prediction for rhetorical questions like (18a) with strong NPIs, but leaves it unclear why questions like (18b), where there is less of an expectation about the answer, allow for weak NPIs: For wh-questions Ladusaw makes use of Karttunen's (1977) analysis of questions. According to this analysis, answers to a wh-question mention only positive instances. This leads to the prediction, strictly speaking, that NPIs are never licensed in such questions with negationless clauses. Indeed, Ladusaw claims that this prediction is correct for wh-questions with (what we call) weak NPIs. For the occurrence of strong NPIs in wh-questions he assumes that Nobody also can be used to give a (somewhat deviant) answer, and that in case the strong NPI is used this is the expected answer which licenses the NPI. Just as for polar questions, here Ladusaw also gets the predictions correct, at best, only for rhetorical questions. Although it is true, and an interesting fact to observe, that a who question like (19) with any is somewhat odd, we have seen already that the prediction that wh-questions don't allow for weak NPIs at all is wrong: sentence (11b) is okay. Ladusaw predicts wrongly for wh-questions used to ask for information, because in these cases the speaker considers it possible that the underlying predicate has some true instances.
A 
Rhetorical questions 4.1 Fauconnier and Krifka on rhetorical questions
Fauconnier suggests an appealing reasoning for why, according to him, NPIs in questions (always) give rise to a rhetorical effect. Remember that according to Fauconnier many NPIs denote minimal endpoints of scales. It follows that they behave similarly to superlatives giving rise to universal readings: (21) a. I wonder if it rained (even) a drop.
b. Every amount of rain that could have fallen is such that I wonder if it (actually) fell.
From this it follows, he suggests, that if an agent has reason to question the truth of R(·) with respect to even a minimal value x of a scale, he implicates disbelief regarding all less minimal alternatives of x. What holds for indirect questions under wonder, holds, according to Fauconnier, for direct questions as well: If I wonder if p holds, I am not sure whether p holds, and this normally is also a necessary condition for directly asking p? For this reason, direct questions with NPIs that denote minimal values, like (22) , also implicate that the speaker disbelieves the truth of all alternatives with less minimal values. This, in turn, implicates (according to Fauconnier) that a question like (22) has the rhetorical effect saying that the addressee didn't help the speaker at all. I find Fauconnier's analysis very appealing, but also far from complete. It is based on the intuitive, but still unexplained assumption that questioning the truth of R(·) with respect to the minimal value of a scale implicates the disbelief regarding all less minimal alternatives. The question that remains to be answered is how we can account for this implicature. Fauconnier suggests that this follows from the meaning of NPIs: the fact that they denote small quantities. But this by itself can't be enough. As discussed by Bolinger (1972) , there are expressions that denote small quantities, like an indication, a tad and most obviously a little, which either do not allow negation or don't imply in such contexts the presence of no quantity at all. It follows that these expressions can't function as negative polarity items, 23 and, we might add, they also don't give rise to rhetorical readings when used in questions. But if this is so, an analysis that tries to explain the rhetorical effect solely in terms of the assumption that NPIs denote minimal quantities won't do.
As we will see later, Krifka's (1990 Krifka's ( , 1992 Krifka's ( , 1995 main contribution to the analysis of NPIs in questions is about information-seeking questions. But also with respect to rhetorical questions he (seems to) help(s) Fauconnier's (1980) analysis a step further. Krifka argues that a NPI can be used in a question only if there is a reason for not using any of the alternatives. One reason might be that by using the alternatives the question becomes unquestionable, giving rise to Fauconnier's implicature and resulting in the rhetorical reading. Unfortunately, however, his analysis of information-seeking questions to be discussed below crucially makes use of the assumption that unquestionability of the alternative questions is not the only reason for using a NPI in a question, which means that Fauconnier's (1980) implicature can still not be explained satisfactory.
Presuppositional explanation of rhetorical use: Lahiri and Guerzoni
We have seen that Fauconnier's and Krifka's approach to account for the rhetorical force of questions with strong NPIs in terms of their meanings is appealing, but also that it doesn't get us far enough: being a minimal element of a scale is crucial in their analysis, but it still relies on an unexplained implicature, and it is left unclear why not all expressions that denote small quantities give rise to rhetorical readings of questions. Whereas Fauconnier and Krifka try to reduce the rhetorical effect of questions with minimizers to the meaning of those minimizers, Guerzoni (2001) , building on Lahiri (1998), proposes to account for the rhetorical effect in terms of the presupposition we associate with strong NPIs. She notes that on Fauconnier's (1975a,b) assumption that even-sentences like (23a) presuppose that French was the least likely language that Mary can speak, together with the hypothesis that strong NPIs take over this presupposition, the rhetorical effect of questions with strong NPIs follows as a theorem.
According to Fauconnier (1975a,b) , Karttunen & Peters (1979) Now suppose that the context in which the question is asked is such that one of those above presuppositions is actually made. In that case, Guerzoni noted, the question is predicted to have a rhetorical reading only. The reason is that the answer is either (23a) with presupposition (23b), or its negation (33a) with presupposition (33b). In case the context in which the question is asked satisfies one or the other presupposition, the question is predicted to allow for only a positive or only a negative answer, for reasons of presupposition satisfaction of the answer. But this means that the question functions rhetorically, and acts practically as an assertion.
As already observed by Borkin (1971) , Fauconnier (1975a,b) and Heim (1984) , the occurrence of even has no semantic/pragmatic effect in combination with strong NPIs like lift a finger, suggesting that these NPIs share the presupposition(s) of even. Indeed, also Krifka (2001) assumes that strong NPIs have this presupposition. This explains, according to Guerzoni (1995) , the rhetorical effect of strong NPIs in questions. But why show these questions only the negative rhetorical force? The reason for this, as shown by Lahiri (1998) , follows from the semantic meaning of the strong NPIs: NPIs like lift a finger denote minimal elements of a scale. Assuming an at least reading of these elements, it can be safely assumed in any context that the sentence with the minimal value is the most likely to be true. Notice that this allows for a negative answer to a question like (26) , because presupposition and assertion are then in accordance with each other. For the positive answer, however, this is not the case. As stressed by Guerzoni (2001) , the positive answer is predicted not to be possible, because it leads to an inconsistency between semantic meaning and presupposition. Thus, in any context only a negative answer to (26) can be given, which explains its particular rhetorical force. Building on Lahiri (1998), a similar analysis for constituent questions can now be developed as well.
Although this analysis looks very straightforward, it crucially makes use of a disputable syntactic assumption. The analysis is based on the natural assumption that an even-question can have both the presupposition of a positive even sentence and of its negation. But how could especially the 'negative' presupposition be derived? As discussed already by Karttunen & Karttunen (1977) and Lahiri (1998) , this requires an underlying negative in structures where it does not surface. Guerzoni argues that this, certainly in first instance, counterintuitive requirement can be met and motivated by assuming that polar questions always involve a hidden whether. This, in turn, gives rise to an alternative question at LF allowing even to take scope over the negation. I am not really the person to judge the feasibility of this syntactic proposal, but I think an analysis should be preferred which is not based on suspicious syntactic maneuvres.
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A more serious problem is that although I agree that the occurrence of even in a question suffices to turn a proper information-seeking question into a rhetorical one, I don't think that this is due to the fact that only one of the answers can satisfy the presupposition of the question. According to my intuition, a question like (26) still is, in principle, information-seeking, although only with respect to a ridiculous small quantity of help. Still intuitively speaking, also the positive answer to (26) is possible, but even that answer has, practically speaking, the same effect as the negative answer. Thus, with Fauconnier and Krifka I think that the rhetorical force should result from the limited way in which the question is still information-seeking.
In fact, we have seen already that the same intuition is shared by Borkin (1971) in her discussion of the effect of NPIs that 'go with even' (like a drop) in negative polar questions like (17a). Recall that according to Borkin (17a) presupposes the general statement that Lois doesn't drink liquor, leaving it open whether she doesn't drink ANY liquor at all, i.e. not even mild ones or minor quantities. But this questionability is unexpected given Guerzoni's proposal.
Perhaps this just means that NPIs like a drop should not be analyzed in terms of even after all. I won't adopt this way out, however, but want to suggest, rather, that the problems are due to the standard presupposition associated with even.
25 Before I will discuss an alternative analysis of even, it will be useful first to discuss Kadmon & Landman's (1990) proposal of how to deal with NPIs in questions. It turns out that their analysis of the licensing of any in questions is based on the same intuition that I share with Borkin with respect to NPIs in questions that 'go with even'.
Kadmon & Landman
Discussing the occurrence of any in (27) , (27) Does Sue have any potatoes? Kadmon & Landman (1990) suggest that the question does not give rise to the strong expectation that Sue doesn't have any potatoes whatsoever, but to a somewhat weaker one instead. If in a context 'potatoes' would normally mean 'cooking potatoes', the effect of any in (27) , according to their intuitions, is that it gives rise to the expectation that Sue doesn't have any cooking potatoes, leaving it open whether she still has other potatoes. As should be obvious, this intuition is the same as we have discussed above w.r.t. NPIs that 'go with even'.
As usual, Kadmon & Landman (1990) account for this intuition in terms of domain widening and strengthening. In the case of assertions, strengthening came down to informativity, routinely reduced to entailment. But we have seen already that the notion of (downward) entailment doesn't work for the licensing of NPIs in questions. Indeed, turning question (28) into (27) by means of domain widening due to the substitution of some by any doesn't make the latter entail the former. • Question Q strengthens Q exactly when Q is already answered, but Q is still unanswered.
With the additional assumption that a negative answer to question (27) is expected/presupposed with respect to the limited domain, they explain why the NPI is licensed by noting that the question is still not settled with respect to an extended domain.
I share the intuitions behind K&L's analysis of a question like (27) and agree that domain widening and something like their notion of strength is crucial for the analysis. However, I think there are two good reasons for not adopting their proposal. First, I find their analysis of a question like (27) appealing only in case the NPI is stressed.
26 I don't think the proposed analysis is suited to account for information-seeking questions where any is not stressed, because for these questions It seems that it is already presupposed that John doesn't think (care) about many things that people normally care about in a relationship, and the question is what about Mary's 'feelings'. If this question allows for a 'yes' answer, allowing the question to be information-seeking, why are questions with minimizers then only rhetorical? 26 Remember that according to Krifka (1995) only stressed any should be treated as a strong NPI.
the analysis is still based on a too strong assumption: though a negative answer to (27) is also in those cases more likely, even with respect to a limited domain the positive answer is not ruled out. Second, even if K&L's analysis of questions with stressed any is appealing, this part also leaves something to be desired: their comparative relation of strength between questions looks stipulative, and defined just to account for the problem at hand. It would be nice if we could account for the same intuition without making use of this stipulative notion.
The rhetorical effect of even-NPIs in questions
In section 2.6 I claimed that Guerzoni's predictions concerning questions that contain even-NPIs are too strong due to her adoption of the standard presupposition associated with even. According to Horn's (1969) To account for this inference, Fauconnier argued that just like superlatives even items also mark the end of a scale, in this case one of informativity/surprisal. Thus, the (second) presupposition should rather be that an item associating with even is the least likely to satisfy the propositional schema. This presupposition was adopted by Karttunen & Peters (1979) and we saw it to be crucial for Guerzoni's (2001) analysis of rhetorical questions. Kay (1990) argues, however, that items that associate with even don't necessarily mark the endpoint of a scale. Although (31a) and (31b) are appropriate, it can hardly be argued that the associated items denote such endpoints:
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(31) a. Not only did Mary win the first round match, she even made it to the semi-finals.
b. The administration was so bewildering that they even had lieutenant colonels making major policy decisions.
But if the items do not denote endpoints of scales, the universal presupposition Fauconnier and Karttunen & Peters (1979) associate with even must be too strong as well.
Does this mean that we should go back to Horn's analysis? Well, not exactly. First, because, as noted by Kay (1990) , a sentence like (29) cannot really serve well as a conversation opener, although there is nothing in Horn's (1969) analysis that can explain this. Second, as noted by Kay, it is unclear how examples like (32a)-(32b) could be analyzed just in terms of 'surprise': 28,29 27 Also, an 'even more challenging question' doesn't need to be the most challenging question, I think. The following discourse gives another problematic example:
(i) Who came? Mary. Even John. AND even Bill. Kay (1990) discusses similar examples involving even and let alone:
(ii) A: Have you read So-and-so's letter? B: Listen I haven't even had time to stack my mail, let alone open it, let alone read it! 28 A sentence 'Nobody recognized me. Not even my wife' would be another problematic example. 29 Kay (1990) also discusses some examples for which an analysis in terms of 'surprise' seems unnatural. He notes himself in footnote 21 that for these cases an analysis of 'expected value' would predict correctly. This suggests that an analysis of 'even' along the lines of Ducrot (1973) and Merin (1999) is appropriate here. Although these analyses are closely related with what I am going to propose, and although 'informativity' is (provably) a special case of 'expected value' rather than the other way around (cf. van Rooy, to appear), I won't go into their interesting analyses, however.
(32) a. Mary knows every place on earth.
b. She has even been to BORneo! How could it still be surprising, Kay wonders, that Mary knows Borneo, if we already know that she knows every place on earth? Kay argues that to account for such examples we should make crucial use of his scalar models. Krifka (1995) explicitly discusses the above example, and gives an, I think, more natural motivation for why even is appropriate in (32b). He crucially makes use of the assumption that the proposition that Mary knows Borneo is informative or surprising even after the truth of (32a) is assumed, which is only possible if we take Borneo not to be in the domain of quantification of every of the first sentence. Thus, what even seems to indicate here is some kind of domain extension.
Still, much in the spirit of Kay (1990) , I would like to adopt an analysis of even along the following lines: Sentence (29) asserts that John likes Mary, and presupposes that (i) there is a salient set of alternatives to John all members of which like Mary, and (ii) John is more unlikely to like Mary than any of these alternatives. 30 The condition that the assertion must be informative requires that John is not part of the salient set of alternatives all of whose members are presupposed to like Mary. 31 Being weaker than Fauconnier's and K&P's analysis, it has no problem to account for (31a) and (31b). Kay (1990) attributes to Kiki Nikiforidou the observation that even-sentences give rise to universal conclusions most naturally in case these sentences are uttered 'out of the blue'. The reason for this, I think, is that now the alternative items are all those that could possibly be alternatives to the associated item. Notice, moreover, that on the newly proposed analysis we predict that (32b) presupposes that Mary has been to all salient places on earth discussed above, which is exactly what (32a) asserts. The informativity of (32b), however, demands that the quantifier in (32a) ranges over a non-universal set.
But can our crucially weaker analysis of even than the one that drives Guerzoni's analysis also account for the rhetorical force of questions of strong NPIs? Let us look first at question (25) repeated below: ( 
25) Can Mary even speak French?
If declarative sentence (23a) gives rise to the presupposition that for any x of a set of salient languages the proposition expressed by 'Mary speaks x' is non-assertable because its truth is already presupposed, it is only natural to assume that interrogative sentence (25) gives rise to the presupposition that for any x of a set of salient languages, the question expressed by 'Does Mary speak x?' is unquestionable because the question is settled already. The appropriateness of the question requires, however, that the issue whether Mary speaks French is still open. Suppose that there are four salient languages: English, Dutch, German and French. Suppose, furthermore, that it is either presupposed to be more likely that Mary can speak any of {English, Dutch, German} than that she can speak French, or that it presupposed that this is less likely. Notice that both of these presuppositions are consistent with the assumption that the question expressed by 'For any x of a set of salient languages, is it true that Mary speaks x?' is settled. Thus, the observed fact that (25) can have two kinds of readings follows from our analysis of even when it is assumed that Mary is either less likely to be able to speak French than any of its alternatives, or more likely.
Back to strong NPIs and rhetorical readings. We assume with Krifka (1995) and Guerzoni (2001) that strong NPIs (i) denote a minimal value, and (ii) share a presupposition with even. However, I will assume that the 'less likely than' part of the presupposition is not taken over from 30 Examples discussed by Wilkinson (1996) concerning embeddings under sorry and glad suggest that our account of even prefers Karttunen & Peters's (1979) scopal analysis to Rooth's (1985) ambiguity analysis. Notice that Wilkinson also gives a for me crucial defense of the 'existential' presupposition associated with even. 31 Notice the resemblance of this analysis of even with that of additive particles like too, also and as well.
this particle. This is also not needed to explain the crucial observation that we can add even to a sentence like (33a) without change of meaning.
(33) a. John didn't lift a finger to help Mary.
b. John didn't even lift a finger to help Mary.
Due to the fact that lift a finger denotes a minimal value and has an at least reading, together with the natural assumption that 'help' behaves monotone upwards, i.e., that if 'help(x)' is true and x is a bigger amount of help than y, then also 'help(y)' is true, it follows that from 'John did x to help Mary' we can always entail that 'John lifted a finger to help Mary'. Thus, the 'additional' implication of (33b) that 'lifting a finger' is the most likely amount of help that John gave to Mary follows already from the fact that the NPI denotes a minimal value. Now consider (26) again:
(26) Did John lift a finger to help Mary?
Due to our presupposition and appropriateness condition, we predict that the question 'Did John do x to help Mary?' is already settled for a salient set of alternatives, though not for the minimal value denoted by the NPI itself. On the assumption that the minimal value has an at least reading, we can now explain the implicature on which Fauconnier's and Krifka's analyses rely, namely that for all alternative values of x it is assumed that John did not do x to help Mary.
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First, it seems reasonable to assume that out of context, the salient set of alternative quantities selected are all quantities of help except for the minimal value. Now, (26) pressuposes that for each member x of this set 'John did x to help Mary' is either known to be true or known to be false. Due to the fact that lift a finger denotes a minimal value and that 'help' behaves monotone upwards, it follows that if there were an x such that 'John did x to help Mary' is presupposed to be true for any alternative amount of help x, this presupposition would make question (26) unquestionable, and, thus, inappropriate. This means that for question (26) to be still open and appropriate, it has to be the case that for any amount of help x, John didn't help Mary with this amount, 33 except, perhaps with respect to the minimal quantity. But this is enough to derive the rhetorical meaning: John either only did the very minimal to help Mary, or nothing at all. Practically, this means that he didn't do anything substantial at all, which indeed is the rhetorical effect of the question. 34 We have seen earlier that negative polar questions can be used either as an ONPQ or as an INPQ. Only under its INPQ-reading does it license negative polarity items, because only then the negative answer is considered to be more likely. As observed already by Borkin (1971) , question (34) indeed can have only the rhetorical reading suggesting that John is not going to help at all. It is easy to see that this is predicted correctly by Guerzoni (2001) , but our analysis accounts for this fact as well. By a similar reasoning as before, the reason for unquestionability of all salient non-minimal quantities of help cannot be that it is already assumed that John is going to give them, for that would make (34) itself unquestionable. As a result, it must be presupposed that John is not going to give any substantial amount of help, giving rise to the rhetorical reading. 32 This implicature, in turn, is derived in a way very similar as Lahiri (1998) and Guerzoni (2001) derive the negative rhetorical effect. But there are some crucial differences: (i) they assume that the question has either a positive or a negative presupposition, while I only assume that for all alternatives the question is settled; (ii) I crucially assume that the question is open, while they do not.
33 This is thus the predicted presupposition that is compatible with the assumption that question (26) is still open. 34 Notice that our analysis, like other analyses, works well not only for minimizer-NPIs, but also for even-type maximizer-NPIs like in a million years. The rhetorical effect of (i) can be explained in the same way as (26): (i) Would you, in a million years, do that?
Note that our analysis also accounts naturally for our intuitions concerning the presupposition and meaning of (27) . (27) This, of course, should not really surprise you: our account of the rhetorical effect of questions containing even-type NPIs was based on the assumption that even extends the domain. Assuming that stressed any, 'comes with even', our analysis of (27) comes down to Kadmon & Landman's (1990) . But the similarity to their analysis suggests that we also have to take over one of their problems: how to give a uniform analysis of strength that accounts for both questions and assertions?
Informative questions: DEness and/or Strength
Questions are, in general, not downward entailing. For this reason, I assume, Ladusaw (1979) tried to account for the licensing of NPIs in questions by looking at their expected answers. Perhaps, however, we can be more Ladusawk than Ladusaw himself, and account for the licensing of NPIs in questions by arguing that, despite contrary appearance, these items occur in DE contexts after all.
Fauconnier and limited scale reversal
Recall that Fauconnier characterized contexts that license NPIs not in terms of downward entailment, but rather in terms of the closely related notion of 'scale reversal'. Fauconnier suggests that indirect-question contexts like 'I wonder if -' are such scale reversal contexts, as well. However, he notes first that such contexts are not scale reversal in general: Although with respect to our common ground we can conclude from (35a) to (35b), this doesn't mean that the truth of (35c) guarantees the truth of (35d): The reason why this inference doesn't go through might be that I already know that (35a) is not true. However, Fauconnier proposes that once we limit ourselves to alternative propositions that the agent still considers possible, the context 'I wonder if -' is scale reversal and thereby licenses NPIs. Because to wonder whether p is true is a precondition for asking whether p is true, Fauconnier suggests that this reasoning explains why also direct questions allow for negative polarity items.
NPIs as restrictions of wh-phrases
In section 3 we saw that only a wh-phrase of a question gives rise to a downward entailing context. Similarly, only in case a negative polarity item forms part of the restriction of a wh-phrase, it holds that a question with, say, any entails the corresponding question with alternative some after domain extension. The problem was that NPIs cannot only be used appropriately in this position, but also in, for instance, a polar question. The natural proposal for a proponent of the DE approach would then be to claim that a polar question is really a wh-question in disguise. 35 And indeed, this seems natural to assume for (36a) and (37a). Intuitively, these questions should be interpreted as (36b) and (37b), respectively, and in that case the domain extension due to the substitution of some for any results in larger domains over which the wh-phrases range. This, in turn, has the effect that under any standard entailment relation between questions, the question with any entails the question with some. Thus, it seems that for the above examples the standard DE-notion of licensing is sufficient, just as the entailment-notion of strength.
Notice that this analysis immediately solves a problem that Kadmon & Landman's (1990) treatment faces. Recall that under their analysis, (37a) with any gives rise to the implicature that the same question with some is settled already. However, they admit that the relevant negative implication for this sentence is weak, up to non-existence. Still, they argue that the negative implicature has not completely disappeared: using any in this question is more polite than using some. Our analysis explains this politeness simply by domain extension, without making use of the problematic assumption that the question with some has to be settled already.
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I believe that some occurrences of NPIs in polar questions can be explained by assuming that the question was really a wh-question in disguise. I don't believe, however, that this can be the general story. First, it could in principle only work for NPIs with an indefinite meaning. But even if we limit ourselves to 'indefinite' NPIs like any and ever, the analysis seems natural only for polar questions that can be read as wh-questions with a mention some reading. For examples with more substantial nouns than 'body' or 'thing' it seems less natural to assume that the NPI gives rise to a new wh-phrase. To account for these and other cases we have to look for an alternative proposal. 35 Indeed, just like in other functional theories of questions, Aloni & van Rooy (2002) equate the meaning of a question with a set of world-assignment pairs. In distinction with other treatments, however, in this analysis an indefinite inside a (wh and polar) question extends the assignment in case it is not 'intervened' by an externally 'static' negation or quantifier. Thus, such an indefinite turns, for instance, a polar question into a wh-question. As reminded to me by Maria Aloni, if we assume that any is an existential quantifier with a larger domain than some, we predict that the question with any entails the corresponding question with some. 36 As an aside, recalling from footnote 7 Giannakidou's (1997) analysis of any, it should be obvious that she also predicts that any can be used appropriately in questions. However, her analysis by itself cannot explain, for instance, why (37a) with any is more polite than the same question with some.
Higginbotham and alternative questions
Higginbotham (1993) also seeks to account for NPIs in questions in terms of DE-licensing. His proposal is that polar questions are, on one reading, silent alternative questions, containing a (possibly tacit) occurrence of either. This either, in turn, is analyzed as a universal quantifier which is DE in its first argument. It follows that NPIs are licensed in questions when they occur in the restrictor of this either.
More in detail, Higginbotham argues that a sentence like (41a) has an interpretation like (41b), which, according to Higginbotham, has on this reading syntactic structure (41c) giving rise to LF (41d): (41) a. John will play chess or checkers.
b. John will play chess and John will play checkers. On the assumption that whether is short for wh + either, whether also admits an interpretation as a universal quantification. Clause (43a) is taken to be syntactically ambiguous between its standard polar reading and an alternative reading with syntactic structure (43b). This latter reading corresponds with LF (43c) with meaning (43d): Assuming that ?p denotes the partition {p, ¬p}, and taking q to be 'that John left', (43d) is predicted to mean {{q, ¬q}, {¬q, ¬¬q}}, which, according to Higginbotham, reduces to the expected partition {q, ¬q}. Thus, both standard and alternative readings of polar questions have the same meaning. Because the main clause to be questioned, i.e. 'that John left', is on its alternative reading in the restrictor of a universal quantifier, NPIs are licensed. Wh-questions license NPIs as well, because they are analyzed as sets of whether questions.
Not being a syntactician, I find Higginbotham's syntactic assumptions hard to judge. But even if these assumptions are feasible, I think his analysis still leaves something to be desired. A first worry is that his reduction from {{q, ¬q}, {¬q, ¬¬q}} to {q, ¬q} is less than straightforward: I only see a reduction to {{q, ¬q}}. Second, how could his purely syntactico-semantic analysis explain why some, but not all, NPIs are licensed in rhetorical questions only? Third, and for me very important, how could Higginbotham's analysis, but also the analysis suggested in the previous section, possibly explain Borkin's (1971) observation that the licensing of NPIs and PPIs seems to correlate with the negative and affirmative expectations, respectively, of the speaker concerning the answer? Thus, even if Higginbotham's analysis would work, it still inherits Ladusaw's (1979) explanatory deficit. But, then, we have seen before that the fact that DE contexts license NPIs can be explained normally in terms of domain widening and strengthening. However, a polar question containing some will not turn the corresponding alternative question into one that is entailed by the related alternative question with any due to domain widening: questions with yes and no as the alternative answers will never (non-trivially) entail each other. Thus, on Higginbotham's proposal, either we must give up the assumption that DEness can be explained in terms of strengthening, or we have to assume that for questions strengthening comes down to something else than entailment.
Krifka: using NPIs to reduce bias
Recall, once more, that according to Kadmon & Landman (1990) the NPI any is used in a polar question to lower the threshold of a positive answer. They assume that without lowering this threshold the question is settled already and should be answered negatively. As I argued above already, this latter assumption seems to be too strong for information-seeking questions: though it is true that for the corresponding question with some a negative answer is more likely than a positive answer, this doesn't mean that the positive answer is ruled out. Thus, the question is biased towards a negative answer, but need not be settled. Based on very general considerations, Krifka (1990 Krifka ( , 1992 Krifka ( , 1995 proposes that a NPI is used in a (polar) information-seeking question to turn a biased question into an unbiased one. He motivates this analysis by noting that, everything else being equal, general questions are normally preferred to specific ones.
Comparing the positive answer to a polar question like Is the card that you drew form the deck the seven of diamonds? with its negative answer, it is clear that the former is much more informative than the latter. The informativity of the possible answers to the question Is the card a diamond? are much more alike. In many circumstances the overall information gain of the latter, more general, question is higher than that of the more specific variant. Krifka notes that in comparison with an interrogative sentence containing an alternative value of a scale, the interrogative containing a NPI denoting its minimal value (or after domain widening) denotes a more general question in the sense discussed above in case the negative answer is more likely than the positive answer. Thus, speaking in terms of domain extension, in case the speaker considers the negative answer to (44a), which asks about recent visits, more likely than the positive answer, (44b) will normally express a more general question. Because general information-seeking questions are, according to Krifka, normally preferred to specific ones, a NPI is allowed in such questions in case the likelihood of the negative answer is larger than that of its positive counterpart. Notice that this analysis can be extended straightforwardly to PPIs in questions: on the assumption that a PPI strengthens the application conditions, a PPI makes a question more general as long as the positive answer is more likely.
I find Krifka's analysis appealing, but more work needs to be done. First, we want more motivation for why general questions should be preferred to specific ones. Second, it remains unclear how Krifka's account of polarity items in questions can be related to his analysis of these items occurring in assertions. What has a preference for a more general question for the case of interrogatives in common with the preference of a more informative proposition for the case of assertions? In the next section I will give a general answer to this question.
Entropy, Relevance and Strength
In the previous section I have argued to account for NPIs in information-seeking questions along the lines of Krifka (1990 Krifka ( , 1992 Krifka ( , 1995 , while for rhetorical questions we need an analysis like that of Kadmon & Landman (1990) . According to Krifka, weak NPIs are permitted in information-seeking questions as long as they make the question more general than the corresponding question without the NPI. Kadmon & Landman (1990) propose that (stressed) any is permitted in a rhetorical question because it turns a settled issue into an unsettled one. Both analyses demand that NPIs weaken the satisfaction conditions with respect to their alternatives. Widening the domain of quantification is perhaps the most obvious, though not the only, way to achieve this. Thus, making a question more general, and turning a settled into an unsettled question are much alike. The crucial difference between NPIs in rhetorical and information-seeking questions -the fact that for rhetorical readings the question must be settled for less minimal values -is due to the fact that only in the former case we associate a presupposition with the NPIs that it shares with even. Thus, disregarding the presupposition, we can think of K&L's comparative notion of strength as a special case of Krifka's comparative relation between questions. This leaves us with the following questions: First, why should a general question in general be preferred to a more specific one? Second, how can this notion of generality be seen as a special case of strength? In this section I will answer both questions by adopting standard techniques used by statisticians, though not semanticists and/or pragmatists, relating generality of questions and informativity of assertions to notions like entropy, relevance and/or utility.
The informativity of a question
To determine the informative value of a question, we will follow the lead of Bar-Hillel & Carnap (1953) . They discuss the problem how to determine the estimated amount of information conveyed by the outcome of an experiment to be made. They equate the value of an experiment with its estimated amount of information, and assume that the possible outcomes denote propositions such that the set of outcomes are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaust the whole state space. In other words, they assume that the set of possible outcomes partitions the set of relevant states. Adopting Groenendijk & Stokhof's (1984) partition semantics of questions, this suggests that their notion of the value of an experiment, which by itself was based on Shannon's (1948) notion of the Entropy of a source, can be used to measure the informativity value of a question as well. For obvious reasons, I will denote the informative value of question Q by E(Q), which will be defined as follows:
To explain this measure, consider the question Who of John, Mary and Sue are sick? This question gives rise to three relevant issues: whether John, whether Mary, and whether Sue are sick or not. 37 The three issues together give rise to 2 3 = 8 relevantly different states of the world, and assuming that it is considered to be equally likely for all of them to be sick or not, and that the issues are independent of one another, it turns out that all 8 states are equally likely to be true. The measure −log 2 P (q) was called the informativity value of the proposition q, inf(q) by Bar-Hillel & Carnap (1953) . Thus, we can define the informativity value of question Q also as the estimated or average informativity value of the (complete) answers as follows:
The informativity of any arbitrary proposition A with respect to our 8 different states of the world equals the number of the above 3 binary issues solved by learning A. Thus, in case I learn (just) that John is sick, one of the above three binary issues, i.e. yes/no-questions, is solved, and the informativity of the proposition expressed by the sentence John is sick = J, inf(J), is 1. Notice that proposition J is compatible with 4 of the 8 possible states of nature, and on our assumptions this means that the probability of J, P (J), is 1 2 . To determine the informational value of a proposition, we looked at the negative logarithm of its probability, where this logarithmic function has a base of 2. Recalling that the logarithm with base 2 of n is simply the power to which 2 must be raised to get n, it indeed is the case that inf(J) = 1, because −log P (J) = −log 1 2 = 1, due to the fact that 2 −1 = 1 2 . Learning that both Mary and Sue are sick however, i.e. learning proposition M ∧ S, has an informative value of 2, because it would resolve 2 of our binary issues given above. More formally, only in 2 of the 8 cases it holds that both women are sick, and thus we assume that the proposition expressed, M ∧ S, has a probability of Recall that any complete answer to our above question Q will reduce our 8 possibilities to 1. Thus, any complete answer, q, will have an 'inf'-value of 3, i.e. it will resolve all three of the relevant binary issues. But if each answer to the question has an informative value of 3, the average amount of information conveyed by the answers, and thus the informative value of the question, E(Q), should be 3 as well. And indeed, because each of the complete answers has a probability of 1 8 to be true, the informative value of the question is according to the above formula equated with (
In general it will hold that when we have n mutually exclusive answers to a question, and all the answers are considered to be equally likely true, the informative value of the question can simply be equated with the informative value of each of its answers, which is −log 2 1 n = log 2 n. The informative value of the question Will the outcome of the flipping of an unbiased coin be heads?, for instance, will be 1, because the question has 2 answers, which by assumption are equally likely to be true.
What if not all of the n answers are equally likely to be true? In that case some answers have a higher informative value than log 2 n, and others have a lower one. It turns out, however, that the average amount of information conveyed by the answers will in that case be lower than in case the answers are equally likely to be true. Consider, for instance, the flipping of a biased coin, whose chance to come up heads after flipping is × 2) = 0.811 < 1. Thus, although one of the answers has an informative value that is 2 times as high as the informative values of the outcomes/answers in case of an unbiased coin, the average amount of information of the answers turns out to be lower. This is in general the case: the informative value of question Q defined as above is maximal just in case the answers are all equally likely to be true. And this seems to confirm to our intuitions. If you want to be sure to find out after 3 yes/no-questions which of the 8 states of our toy-example actually obtains, we should ask the three yes/no-questions which have maximal E-value. That is, we should ask for each individual separately whether he or she is sick, which all have an 'inf'-value of 1, and we should not ask risky questions that might, but need not, convey more information, like Are John and Mary the ones who are sick?
Having defined when a question has its maximal informative value, we now would like to know under which circumstances it reaches its minimal value. Intuitively, a question is (at least) valueless in case you already know the answer to the question. And, unsurprisingly, this is what comes out: E(Q) = 0 just in case only one answer has a positive probability (and thus has probability 1), and for all other cases the question has a value strictly higher than 0.
NPIs and entropy
Our aim was to define an ordering relation between questions (partitions) that captures both Krifka's (1990 Krifka's ( , 1992 Krifka's ( , 1995 and Kadmon & Landman's (1990) comparative relation between questions. I claim that the (partial) ordering relation induced by entropy is the one we were looking for. Take a polar question, Q = {q, ¬q}, and assume that the question is biased: its negative answer, ¬q, is taken to be more probable than its positive answer. In the extreme case this is because it is already settled that ¬q is true, P (¬q) = 1 and P (q) = 0. Notice that in case the question is settled already, its entropy is minimal, 0, but also that in case the question is just biased its entropy is not as maximal as it could be: there is a closely related other question with a higher entropy or informativity value. We have seen that according to Krifka a NPI is used in information-seeking questions to turn a biased question into a (more) unbiased one, while K&L propose that due to the use of a NPI like (stressed) any a settled question becomes unsettled. Indeed, suppose that we turn Q into Q by making use of an NPI. This NPI weakens the satisfaction conditions for the positive answer, q , and strengthens the satisfaction conditions for the negative answer ¬q . This cannot only result in turning settled Q into unsettled Q , but also in changing biased Q into less, or even un, biased Q . What is important is that in both cases the entropy of the question increases: E(Q ) > E(Q). Thus, the ordering relation between questions induced by our notion of entropy captures both of the comparative notions of K&L and Krifka. This suggests that for polar questions, strength should be defined in terms of entropy.
For constituent questions something similar holds. Let us represent such interrogative sentences as [wh x : Sx]?P x. We first look at the effect of NPIs in the predicate position of such a question. Assuming that the NPI turns question Q into Q by changing predicate P into P which has weaker satisfaction conditions. Suppose now that for any individual d in the domain over which wh ranges that is known to have property S is such that the difference between P (d ∈P ) and P (d ∈ P ) is greater or equal than the difference between P (d ∈P ) and P (d ∈ P ), whereP denotes the complement of P . This condition holds in particular, though not exclusively, in case no S is expected to have property P , though at least some individuals satisfying S might have property P . Notice that in the latter case K&L would say that NPI any strengthens the question. What is important to observe is that the constituent question Q has a higher entropy than Q if and only if the above condition, of which K&L's situation is again a special case, is satisfied. Thus, also here it is natural to reduce strength to entropy.
What about the effect of NPIs occurring in the subject position of a constituent question? The effect of the NPI is now to widen the domain over which the wh-phrase ranges. As we saw already in section 3.1, constituent questions are DE in subject position, meaning that the effect of turning Q into Q now has the result that Q entails Q: every (total) answer to Q will also be a (total) answer to Q. If we want to account for NPIs in questions in terms of entropy, the ordering relation induced by entropy should better relate with the ordering relation induced by entailment. And, indeed, this is the case: if Q entails Q it will also be the case that E(Q ) ≥ E(Q), whenever the entropies are determined with respect to the same probability function.
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In this section I have shown how the comparative relations between questions proposed by K&L and Krifka can be reduced to entropy, suggesting that for questions, strength should be instantiated as entropy. Moreover, I have argued that entropy is also the natural cousin of the notion of strength they used for assertions: for assertions strength was instantiated as informativity, and we have seen that the entropy of a question measures the average informativity of its answers. Still, you might wonder, why should entropy be such a natural measure? In fact, why should informativity be so important for the occurrence of NPIs in sentences in the first place?
Entropy, informativity and Relevance
There is a long story to be told to answer the questions we ended up with in the previous subsection. This story involves the standard theory of rationality, i.e. Bayesian Decision Theory, definitions of utilities of questions and answers, and proofs that these latter notions reduce to informationtheoretic notions of which our notions of entropy, E(Q), and informativity, inf(q), in turn are special cases. This is not the place to tell this story, and I have done so elsewhere. 39 Still, some facts are worth rehearsing. I argue that Gricean maxims of quantity and relevance can be derived from the assumption that in cooperative conversations information is given by you, and asked for by me, to resolve my decision problem. In terms of decision problems we can define the utilities of questions and answers. Then, following Blackwell (1953) , it can be shown that the entailment relation between questions can be thought of as the semantic abstraction of the pragmatic ordering relation induced by the decision-theoretic notion of utility: Q entails Q if and only if the utility of Q is greater than or equal to the utility of Q with respect to every decision problem. If only truth is at stake, a decision problem can be modeled by a partition of the logical space. If Q is this partition, its entropy models the difficulty of the decision: the decision which element of Q is true is most difficult when its elements are considered equally likely. New information might reduce this entropy. If E P q (Q) denotes the entropy of Q w.r.t. probability function P after q is learned, we can equate this reduction of entropy, E P (Q) − E P q (Q), with the relevance of q w.r.t. decision problem Q and P , R P Q (q ). The relevance of question Q , R P Q (Q ), can be defined as the average relevance of its possible answers: R P Q (Q ) = q ∈Q P (q ) × R P Q (q ). If the decision problem is which of the answers to Q is true, where Q is a more fine-grained question partition as Q , it can be shown (van ) that the relevance of question, R P Q (Q ) comes down to the entropy of Q : E(Q ). Making use of Blackwell's (1953) we can also relate entailment between questions and relevance: in case only truth is at stake, Q entails Q iff Q is always at least as relevant as Q (Q |= Q iff ∀P and Q : R P Q (Q ) ≥ R P Q (Q )). For assertions informativity is a special case of relevance: First, remember that one way to measure the relevance of proposition A with respect to partition Q and probability function P is as the reduction of entropy of Q due to A: E P (Q) − E P A (Q). Suppose now that partition Q equals the question how the world is like, i.e. the partition corresponding with the set of all worlds, i.e. Q = W . In that case it holds in case P distributes the probabilities equally over the worlds, that A is more relevant than B iff it is more informative, reducing R P Q (·) to inf(·). Then it holds that A is always at least as informative as B (∀P : inf P (A) ≥ inf P (B)) iff A |= B. Thus, for both questions and answers informativity/entailment is a special case of relevance. Assuming that relevance gives rise to a scale of which -as we just saw -the standard one is a special case, we can explain linguistic phenomena standardly dealt with i.t.o. degree of information, e.g. the licensing of NPIs, i.t.o. the more general degree of relevance.
Strength: informativity or relevance?
Until now I have assumed that for assertions strength should always be measured by informativity: an assertion is stronger just in case it denotes a more informative proposition. And, indeed, the fact that minimizer-NPIs like a dime are licensed in DE contexts can be explained naturally in terms of this notion of strength. In a recent discussion, Israel (2001) calls the attention to NPIs like all that and long that don't denote minimal quantities. He notes that their use under a negation makes the resulting sentence less rather than more informative. b. This won't take long.
It should be clear that the existence of such examples is a threat to any approach that tries to explain the acceptability of NPIs under negation in terms of a notion of strength. Indeed, if strength should always be measured in terms of informativity, (45a) and (45b) are clear counterexamples to the proposed analysis. On the other hand, Israel suggests a Gricean explanation for why NPIs might be used to weaken a claim: it might work in the speaker's disadvantage to commit herself to a stronger proposition. Still, the question arises whether we cannot account for this intuition in terms of strength once we assume that strength should be measured in terms of relevance. I will suggest that this answer can be answered positively due to the fact that the relevance of a proposition does, in general, not behave monotone increasing with respect to informativity.
Until now we have assumed that the relevance of an utterance should always be measured in terms of the way it helps to resolve an agent's decision problem. This notion of relevance can really be thought of as a fully cooperative notion of relevance. But we all know, of course, thatGrice notwithstanding -participants of a conversation do not always act completely cooperative. To explain some linguistic phenomena where non-cooperativity plays an important role, Merin (1999a,b) makes use of another relevance-function. He measures the utility of a proposition in terms of (something like) the statistical notion of relevance: r h (A) = P (h/A) − P (h). Thus, A has a greater relevance than B if and only if A makes 'goal'-proposition h more likely than B does. What is remarkable about this notion of relevance is that it can happen that if A |= B and h |= A, it might be the case that r h (A) < r h (B). Although this property might be surprising, I think it is a desirable one, for in terms of it we might explain Israel's (2001) assumption that committing oneself might be disadvantaguous in terms of relevance. Until now we have assumed that A, for instance, just denotes the proposition expressed by 'A'. But now suppose that goal-proposition h denotes the set of worlds where certain facts hold and where the speaker doesn't make many commitments. Assume also that if a speaker says 'A', she is committed to A, and that 'commitment' acts like a necessity operator: the set of worlds in which speaker s is committed to A, . I conclude that while sentences like (45a) and (45b) with nonminimizer NPIs are clear counterexamples to the 'strength-as-informativity' approach, they are not counterexamples if one assumes that strength should be measured in terms of relevance.
